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A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED
STATES-JAPAN STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT
Ian Roberts McConnel*
Abstract: On August 13, 2004, a United States Marine Corps helicopter
crashed on the campus of Okinawa International University. The helicop-
ter crash and the resulting U.S. military investigation served to reinvigorate
pent up resentment and anger towards the U.S. military presence in
Okinawa, threatening to destabilize the long standing relationship between
the two nations. This Note discusses the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agree-
ment which, among other things, apportions jurisdictional authority over
off-base U.S. military accidents that occur on Okinawa. This Note argues
that the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (U.S.-Japan SOFA) should
be a reciprocal agreement and that the United States should amend the
Agreed Minutes of the U.S.-Japan SOFA to allow for a joint effort in
investigating and securing off-base military accident sites. Altering the U.S.-
Japan SOFA will be a substantial step in demonstrating that the United
States views Japan as an equal partner in the effort to encourage peace and
prosperity in the Asian hemisphere.
Introduction
On August 13, 2004, a United States Marine Corps Sea Stallion
helicopter crashed on the campus of Okinawa International Univer-
sity.1 When looked at in isolation, the helicopter crash and the United
States’s handling of the aftermath appears to be a relatively innocuous
and benign incident.2 There were no casualties, and the wreckage was
cleaned up in less than a week.3 Yet, the helicopter crash and the re-
sulting U.S. military investigation are set within the larger context of
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1 Anti-U.S. Military Rally at Crash Site Draws 30,000 Okinawan Protesters, Agence Fr.
Presse, Sept. 12, 2004, 2004 WL 93524243; U.S. Chopper Crash, Int’l Herald Tribune,
Sept. 9, 2004, 2004 WL 85019974.
2 See U.S. Chopper Crash, supra note 1.
3 U.S. Chopper Crash, supra note 1.
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almost sixty years of pervasive U.S. military presence in Okinawa.4 As a
result, this seemingly minor accident has served to reinvigorate pent
up resentment and anger towards the U.S. presence in Okinawa,
threatening to destabilize the long standing relationship between the
two nations.5
This Note discusses whether the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces
Agreement (U.S.-Japan SOFA) that deªnes the scope of U.S. jurisdic-
tion over U.S. forces in Okinawa should be revised. Part I provides a
historical background of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa and
the recent helicopter accident that occurred August 13, 2004. Part II
gives the historical background of SOFAs. Part II also introduces and
discusses the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the U.S.-
Japan SOFA which supports that treaty. Part III provides a resolution
to the issue of whether the U.S.-Japan SOFA should be altered and, if
so, what the recommended changes should entail.
I. Background and History
A. The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa
On March 26, 1945, the last large battle of World War II began
with the commencement of the U.S. assault for control of Okinawa.6
Approximately three and a half months later, the Japanese govern-
ment signed a surrender agreement, beginning the formal occupa-
tion of Okinawa by U.S. military forces.7 In 1952, the Japanese gov-
ernment signed the Japanese-American Security Treaty, permitting
the United States to retain control over Okinawa in exchange for end-
ing the U.S. occupation of the Japanese mainland.8
                                                                                                                     
4 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Em-
pire 37 (2000) [hereinafter Johnson]; see Mike Millard, Okinawa, Then and Now, in Oki-
nawa: Cold War Island 93, 98 (Chalmers Johnson ed., 1999).
5 See Japan to Demand Investigatory Power Over U.S. Military Accidents, Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Sept. 18, 2004, 2004 WL 89302672; Anti-U.S. Military Rally at Crash Site Draws
30,000 Okinawan Protesters, supra note 1; Johnson, supra note 4, at 37; Millard, supra note
4, at 98.
6 Johnson, supra note 4, at 38; Masahide Ota, Re-Examining the History of the Battle of
Okinawa, in Okinawa: Cold War Island 13, 13 (Chalmers Johnson ed., 1999).
7 Ota, supra note 6, at 13–14.
8 Johnson, supra note 4, at 38. Originally, the 1952 agreement between Japan and the
United States envisioned Okinawa becoming a United Nations Trusteeship, “but the
United States abandoned this arrangement and retained complete control over the is-
land.” See Andrew Daisuke Stewart, Kayano v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee Revis-
ited: Recognition of Ryukyuans as a Cultural Minority Under the International Covenant on Civil
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After twenty years of U.S. military rule, the Japanese government
negotiated the ofªcial return of Okinawa to Japanese control in
1972.9 Nevertheless, from 1952 until the present, the United States
has continued to maintain an expansive military presence on Oki-
nawa.10 While the island of Okinawa is approximately the size of Los
Angeles and is less than one percent of Japan’s total land mass, there
are over 26,000 U.S. personnel stationed in Okinawa.11 This is roughly
half of all the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.12 Approximately seventy-
ªve percent of the land the United States occupies for its bases in Ja-
pan is situated on Okinawa, and the U.S. military bases cover ap-
proximately twenty percent of the entire island.13
Not surprisingly, the large U.S. military presence in such a rela-
tively small geographic area has created friction with the local popu-
lace.14 In Mike Millard’s essay Okinawa, Then and Now, he catalogues a
series of incidents involving U.S. military personnel and Okinawan
citizens:
In 1955, an American military ofªcer raped and killed a six-
year-old girl; in 1959, a jet ªghter crashed into an elemen-
tary school killing 17 children and injuring 121 others; in
1963, a high-school girl was killed by a U.S. military truck; in
1965, a ªfth-grade schoolgirl playing in her garden was killed
by a U.S. military trailer dropped from a helicopter; in 1968,
a B-52 heading for Vietnam crashed just after takeoff, creat-
ing an anti-U.S.-military movement on the island; in 1970, a
car driven by an American civilian struck an Okinawan pe-
destrian and military police ªred shots to intimidate the
crowd that gathered, setting off riots in which 73 vehicles
were set aªre. In the past twenty-ªve years since Okinawa’s
reversion to Japan, there have been 127 aircraft accidents,
                                                                                                                     
and Political Rights, An Alternative Paradigm for Okinawan Demilitarization, 4 Asian-Pac. L. &
Pol’y J. 11, 382, 422 (2003).
9 Stewart, supra note 8, at 424–25.
10 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Ofªce, Issues Involved on Reducing the Impact of
the U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa 2 (1998) [hereinafter GAO Report].
11 Johnson, supra note 4, at 36; John C. Wilhelm, U.S. Military Forward Presence in Oki-
nawa, Japan, at iii (2003), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA415741 (on ªle with the U.S.
Army War College at http://catsipac.carlisle.army.mil/).
12 See Wilhelm, supra note 11, at iii.
13 Millard, supra note 4, at 97; GAO Report, supra note 10, at 2.
14 See Millard, supra note 4, at 97–98.
168 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:165
137 brush ªres caused by military exercises, and 12 cases of
Okinawans killed by American personnel.15
Finally, in 1995, three U.S. military personnel brutally assaulted and
raped a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl.16
B. The Helicopter Crash
It is within this context that the August 13, 2005 helicopter acci-
dent occurred.17 After controlling the ªre at the crash site, local Oki-
nawan police detectives and local political leaders were barred from
having any access to the accident.18 After repeated requests from the
Japanese government to be allowed access to the area, the U.S. mili-
tary ªnally permitted local Okinawan ofªcials and Japanese investiga-
tors to enter the crash site.19 Not a single scrap of the aircraft re-
mained for the Okinawan ofªcials to investigate.20 “Even surface dirt
had been removed with shovels.”21
On September 12, 2004, 30,000 Okinawan citizens rallied to pro-
test the accident and the handling of the aftermath.22 They de-
manded the closure of the Futenma U.S. Marine Corps Air Station,
which is situated adjacent to the university campus and a fundamental
revision of the U.S.-Japan SOFA.23
II. Discussion of Issues
A. Development of Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs)
SOFAs are agreements entered into by two or more states that
delineate the explicit legal rights and obligations of military forces
present in foreign countries.24 While they may appear to be merely an
                                                                                                                     
15 Id.
16 Id. at 96.
17 See Millard, supra note 4, at 97–98; Anti-U.S. Military Rally at Crash Site Draws 30,000
Okinawan Protesters, supra note 1.




2230,000 Rally to Shut Down Futenma Air Station, Int’l Herald Tribune, Sept. 14, 2004,
2004 WL 85020009.
23Id. This rally was “the largest anti-base gathering since outrage spread across Oki-
nawa Prefecture over the [1995] abduction and rape of a local schoolgirl by U.S. service-
men.” Id.
24 Steven G. Hemmert, Peace-Keeping Mission SOFAs: U.S. Interests in Criminal Jurisdiction,
17 B.U. Int’l L.J. 215, 217 (1999).
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administrative convenience, SOFAs establish “the foundation for dip-
lomatic reciprocity and a ‘smooth working relationship’ between the
sending and receiving nations.”25 SOFAs not only apportion criminal
jurisdiction between the sending and receiving nations, but they also
address “civil jurisdiction, claims, taxes, duties, services provided by
each party, and procuring supplies and local employees.”26
SOFAs are a relatively recent development in international law.27
Prior to the SOFA entered into by NATO in 1951, a comprehensive
document did not exist that delineated the legal rights of U.S. mili-
tary forces situated in alien territory.28 Rather, the common law doc-
trine of the “law of the ºag” governed the jurisdictional authority over
U.S. military forces stationed abroad.29 First articulated in The Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, the “law of the ºag” states that when a sovereign
country permits a friendly foreign sovereign to enter its territory, it
implicitly consents to the jurisdictional immunity of the visiting sover-
eign.30 Up until the conclusion of World War II, the dominant prac-
tice of the United States was that U.S. forces stationed abroad were
completely immune from the host country’s jurisdictional reach.31
After World War II and beginning with the Cold War, NATO states
began to station permanent troops within each other’s territory.32 As a
result, NATO Member States entered into a reciprocal SOFA to provide
a more formal arrangement between sovereigns regarding jurisdic-
tional authority of foreign forces stationed within their territory.33 The
NATO SOFA is the model upon which the United States structured its
jurisdictional relationship with other non-NATO host nations.34 Cur-
rently, “absent express waiver of jurisdiction through an agreement
                                                                                                                     
25 Jaime M. Gher, Status of Forces Agreements: Tools to Further Effective Foreign Policy and
Lessons to Be Learned from the United States-Japan Agreement, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 227, 229–30
(2002) (quoting Colonel Richard J. Erickson, Status of Forces Agreements: A Sharing of Sover-
eign Prerogative, 37 A.F. L. Rev. 137, 137 (1994)); see Hemmert, supra note 24, at 220.
26 Mark E. Eichelman, International Criminal Jurisdiction Issues for the United States Mili-
tary, 2000 Army Law. 23, 23 (Aug.).
27 Adam B. Norman, The Rape Controversy: Is a Revision of the Status of Forces Agreement
with Japan Necessary?, 6 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 717, 731 (1996).
28 Hemmert, supra note 24, at 217.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 218; see The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 147 (1812).
31 Hemmert, supra note 24, at 218.
32 Id. at 219.
33 Id. at 219–20.
34 See Eichelman, supra note 26, at 23.
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such as a SOFA, the receiving state should have complete peacetime
jurisdiction over all foreign troops inside its territory.”35
B. The U.S.-Japan SOFA
In 1960, the United States and Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security as well as the SOFA that supports that
treaty.36 The U.S.-Japan SOFA delineates the scope of jurisdiction over
U.S. forces in Japan.37 Unlike the NATO SOFA, however, the U.S.-
Japan SOFA is a comprehensive, non-reciprocal agreement.38 The
term “non-reciprocal” means that the U.S.-Japan SOFA applies unilat-
erally to Japan.39 If Japanese troops were stationed in U.S. territory,
the U.S.-Japan SOFA would not apportion jurisdictional authority be-
tween the two nations; rather, the Japanese military personnel would
simply be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.40
In contrast, the U.S.-Japan SOFA curtails the scope of Japanese
jurisdictional authority over U.S. forces stationed in Japan.41 For ex-
ample, Article XVII of the U.S.-Japan SOFA states that U.S. military
personnel suspected of committing a crime in Japanese territory will
remain in the custody of the U.S. military until they are formally in-
dicted by the host nation.42 Moreover, if a criminal act is committed by
U.S. service personnel during the performance of an “ofªcial duty,”
the United States has primary criminal jurisdiction over that person.43
                                                                                                                     
35 Hemmert, supra note 24, at 220.
36 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America
and Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T 1633 [hereinafter Treaty of Mutual Coop-
eration]; Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security:
Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan.
19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1652 [hereinafter U.S-Japan SOFA].
37 See U.S.-Japan SOFA, supra note 36, at 1664.
38 See Gher, supra note 25, at 236–37. “Currently, few non-NATO countries are parties
to reciprocal SOFAs with the United States.” Id. at 236; see Norman, supra note 27, at 733.
39 Gher, supra note 25, at 236–37.
40 See Gher, supra note 25, at 236–37.
41 See U.S.-Japan SOFA, supra note 36, at 1665; Norman, supra note 27, at 733.
42 U.S.-Japan SOFA, supra note 36, at 1665; William K. Lietzau, Using the Status of Forces
Agreement to Incarcerate United States Service Members on Behalf of Japan, 1996 Army Law. 3, 4–5
(Dec.). As a result of this provision, Japanese ofªcials investigating the 1995 rape of an
Okinawan schoolgirl were initially unable to take custody of the three U.S. servicemen
suspected of committing the crime, inciting mass protests and local outrage. See Norman,
supra note 27, at 723–24.
43 U.S.-Japan SOFA, supra note 36, at 1664; Eichelman, supra note 26, at 24. Which ac-
tivities are considered an “ofªcial duty” is determined unilaterally by the United States.
Eichelman, supra note 26, at 24.
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Regarding accidents in Okinawa involving U.S. personnel and U.S.
property, the Agreed Minutes to the U.S.-Japan SOFA states:
The Japanese authorities will normally not exercise the right
of search, seizure, or inspection with respect to any persons or
property within the facilities and area in use by and guarded
under the authority of the United States armed forces or with
respect to property of the United States armed forces wher-
ever situated, except in cases where the competent authorities
of the United States armed forces consent to such search, sei-
zure, or inspection by the Japanese authorities of such per-
sons or property.44
The United States has viewed the partial waiver of jurisdiction in non-
reciprocal SOFAs as compensation for the large cost associated with
maintaining U.S. forces abroad.45 Non-NATO Member States have
agreed to these agreements, in part, because of a concern over the
spread of Communism and the desire to have U.S. forces stationed in
their country to mitigate that perceived threat.46
C. Perspectives Regarding the U.S.-Japan SOFA
Japanese critics of the U.S.-Japan SOFA have viewed the limita-
tions on Japan’s jurisdictional authority and the fact that it is a non-
reciprocal agreement to be a fundamental infringement upon Japa-
nese sovereignty.47 They perceive “the United States’ refusal to turn
over its criminal suspects, even in cases where the Japanese had the
primary jurisdictional right to prosecute, as a means to impede their
investigations and enable U.S. service members to escape justice.”48
The inequality associated with the U.S.-Japan SOFA has left the im-
pression on many Okinawans that the United States is not “playing
fair” and views itself as “superior” to the host nation.49
The United States’s reluctance to enter into an agreement that
apportions jurisdictional authority more equitably is predicated upon
                                                                                                                     
44 Agreed Minutes to the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Coop-
eration and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities
and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19,
1960, 11 U.S.T. 1749, 1754 [hereinafter Agreed Minutes to the U.S.-Japan SOFA].
45 See Norman, supra note 27, at 733.
46 See id.
47 See Eichelman, supra note 26, at 27; Gher, supra note 25, at 239.
48 Eichelman, supra note 26, at 27.
49 See Norman, supra note 27, at 734.
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a concern regarding the Japanese criminal justice system.50 The Japa-
nese legal system provides wide discretion to investigating authorities,
permitting them “to investigate and to ‘persuade’ the accused to
comply with their efforts.”51 Furthermore, suspects in Japan do not
have many of the Miranda rights that are available to criminal suspects
in the United States.52 Suspects in Japan may be detained for up to
twenty-three days without being formally charged.53 “Throughout this
time, the suspect is isolated from both family and legal counsel and
subject to unrestricted police interrogation.”54 American proponents
for the current U.S.-Japan SOFA argue that the unequal apportion-
ment of jurisdictional authority between the two states better safe-
guards a U.S. serviceperson’s constitutional right to due process un-
der the law.55
III. Analysis
In addressing previous complaints regarding the jurisdictional
apportionment of the U.S.-Japan SOFA, the United States has taken
few if any substantive steps towards correcting the inherent inequality
in the agreement.56 In response to public outrage regarding the rape
of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen in 1995, the
United States established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa
(SACO).57 This Committee was established to recommend actions to
reduce the impact of U.S. forces in Okinawa.58 While the SACO pro-
posed several improvements to the procedures of the SOFA, it did not
recommend a fundamental reassessment of the agreement.59 Moreo-
ver, the SACO Final Report was a non-binding agreement that the
United States was not obligated to implement.60
More recently, in response to the helicopter crash on Okinawa
International University, the United States and Japan have established
“guidelines,” which purport to permit Japanese police to maintain
                                                                                                                     
50 Eichelman, supra note 26, at 28.
51 Gher, supra note 25, at 244; Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese
Criminal Justice, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 317, 333 (1992).
52 See Eichelman, supra note 26, at 28.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Gher, supra note 25, at 244.
56 See GAO Report, supra note 10, at 54, 55.
57 Id. at 2.
58 Id. at 2–3.
59 See generally id. at 54–55.
60 See id. at 18.
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control of off-base accident sites.61 Under the new guidelines, when a
U.S. military accident occurs outside a U.S. military base, two circular
perimeters will be established around the crash site.62 The Japanese
authorities will control the outer perimeter and both countries will
jointly control the inner perimeter.63 Nevertheless, Japanese authori-
ties cannot regulate U.S. military ofªcials when they enter the crash
site, and the United States retains exclusive control of the crashed air-
craft.64 While these new guidelines may be an improvement, they do
not address the issue of inherent inequality in the current U.S.-Japan
SOFA.65 In light of the current global war on terrorism, the ability to
forward deploy U.S. forces to Okinawa may be strategically important
to the United States now more than ever before.66 The United States
places its critical relationship with Japan in jeopardy by not adequately
addressing the Okinawan concerns over the fundamental inequality
of the U.S.-Japan SOFA.67
The United States should alter the current SOFA in two ways.68
First, the U.S.-Japan SOFA should be a reciprocal agreement.69 “Draft-
ing a SOFA does not merely create a legally binding document, but
rather fosters a partnership, embracing another culture and sharing
human values.”70 By making the arrangement reciprocal, the United
States will recognize that Japan is a legally equal sovereign, and this
recognition may ease some of the tension between the two nations.71
Second, the United States should amend the Agreed Minutes of the
U.S.-Japan SOFA to allow for a joint effort in investigating and secur-
ing off-base U.S. military accident sites.72 The new guidelines recently
set forth regarding U.S. military accidents outside U.S. military bases
on Okinawa are just that: “guidelines.”73 The new policies and proce-
dures should be directly incorporated into the U.S.-Japan SOFA to
                                                                                                                     
61 US Agrees to Let Japan Control Civilian Sites After Military Accidents, Mainichi Daily





66 See Wilhelm, supra note 11, at 15, 17.
67 See Anti-U.S. Military Rally at Crash Site Draws 30,000 Okinawan Protesters, supra note 1;
Japan to Demand Investigatory Power Over U.S. Military Accidents, supra note 5.
68 See Gher, supra note 25, at 256; Norman, supra note 27, at 740.
69 Id.
70 Gher, supra note 25, at 250.
71 See Norman, supra note 27, at 738.
72 See Japan to Demand Investigatory Power Over U.S. Military Accidents, supra note 5.
73 See US Agrees to Let Japan Control Civilian Sites After Military Accidents, supra note 61.
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ensure that they are binding on both parties.74 By requiring U.S. mili-
tary ofªcials to cooperate with Japanese ofªcials regarding U.S. mili-
tary accidents that occur off-base, friction with the local populace and
perceptions of malfeasance on the part of U.S. investigators will be
further reduced.75
Lieutenant General Thomas Waskov, the commander of U.S.
Forces in Japan, defended the United States’s handling of the heli-
copter accident by stating at a press conference that the conduct of
the investigation was “precisely in the conªnes of the agreement we
have with the government of Japan.”76 While this statement may be
legally accurate, it fails to recognize the need to adapt the legal
framework of the U.S.-Japan SOFA to an increasingly important and
evolving relationship.77
Conclusion
The August 13, 2004 U.S. helicopter crash on Okinawan Interna-
tional University has forced the United States to reexamine the alloca-
tion of jurisdictional authority under the current U.S.-Japan SOFA.
Recognizing the continued importance of the U.S-Japan relationship,
the United States should seize this opportunity to reassess its inher-
ently unequal approach to jurisdictional apportionment. Although
altering the U.S.-Japan SOFA may not entirely assuage the lasting re-
sentment of the Okinawan populace towards sixty years of continued
U.S. military presence in Okinawa, it will be a substantial step in dem-
onstrating to the Okinawans, and the Japanese people in general, that
the United States views Japan as an equal partner in the effort to en-
courage peace and prosperity in the Asian hemisphere.
                                                                                                                     
74 See id.
75 See Kanako Takahara, Missing Pin Caused Copter Crash: Report, The Japan Times On-
line, Oct. 6, 2004, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20041006a2.htm;
James Brooke, A Crash, and the Scent of Pizzatocracy, Anger Okinawa, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13,
2004, 2004 WL 92535804.
76 U.S. Forces Chief Defends Right to Bar Cops from Crash Probe, Japan Times, Aug. 27, 2004,
available at 2004 WL 56378959.
77 See Gher, supra note 25, at 256; Norman, supra note 27, at 740.
